Steve Hayes
2008-09-11 05:17:13 UTC
10 September 2008
The political Left in South Africa is at a crossroads in the history of its
revolution, according to the SA Communist Partys policy conference discussion
document released today.
As the National Liberation Movement prepares for elections in the first half
of next year, and as we face the many new possibilities but also challenges
that have emerged since the ANCs 52nd National Conference, the question of
State power and the role of the SACP in this regard have become even more
critical.
Both the opportunities and the dangers have escalated. The SACP has a major
role to play in the current context and much depends on our ability to rise to
the occasion, the document said.
Many important positive resolutions were adopted at Polokwane, and there was
generally a much improved policy-making engagement within the African National
Congress, SACP and Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu) alliance.
However, the document said there were many challenges and threats.
The ANC, in particular, continued to be beset with very serious factional
crises and these continually spilled over into its alliance partners.
The capacity of the ANC to run an effective election campaign or to provide
strategic leadership under these conditions, and if not immediately addressed,
could be impaired.
Among other things, there were also fight back initiatives in some quarters,
seeking to undermine the progressive outcomes of Polokwane.
There was rank opportunism in some quarters either by those who regarded
themselves Polokwane victors and who sought to advance not the policy
positions agreed at conference but their own personal careers.
There were also those who were suddenly crossing the floor and becoming
zealots of the new cause.
And, at the back of all of this, was the sheer power and tactical flexibility
of the capitalist class within society, according to the documents.
TWO CONTRADICTORY FUTURE SCENARIOS
The current post-Polokwane reality contained at least two contradictory
potential scenarios.
Firstly, a scenario in which the many positive features of Polokwane the
opening up of democratic space, the consolidation of fresh policy, the
rebuilding of mass campaigning and organisation, were all taken forward.
Secondly, a negative scenario in which the Left failed to hegemonise the
post-Polokwane reality, and instead (and particularly after national elections
in 2009) a new alliance of 1996 class project floor-crossers,
compradorists and fugitives from justice coalesced around a programme of
awarding influential posts, tenders and contracts to themselves, while the
factional destabilisation (and not democratic transformation) of the state,
including the criminal justice system, persisted.
If the latter scenario prevailed, the Left would be used for the electoral
campaign and then dumped, with some individuals co-opted, while the rest were
marginalised, perhaps more brutally than before.
We are, therefore, at the crossroads in the history of our revolution. The
conjuncture is full of real space for consolidating an effective, progressive,
programmatic approach to state power.
However, the space opened up by Polokwane can also be squandered and the
opportunity lost, the document said.
PARTY INDEPENDENCE?
The struggle to ensure the hegemony of the Left in the present reality made it
imperative that the SACP return to the subject of the party and state power.
The two general possible electoral modalities for the party in 2009, were
firstly, independent [SACP] electoral lists on the voters roll with the
possible objective of constituting a coalition alliance agreement
post-elections.
Alternatively, an electoral pact with the alliance partners, which could
include agreement on deployments, possible quotas, the accountability of
elected representatives, including the accountability of SACP cadres to the
party, the election manifesto, and the importance of an independent face and
role for the SACP and its cadres within legislatures.
In practice (at least for the prospective national/provincial elections of
2009), the SACP had already chosen this latter option.
Already the SACP was actively participating in the ANC-led election campaign
planning, election manifesto preparations, and related policy-development
processes.
This did not mean that the alternative option of an independent SACP electoral
list should quietly and now forever disappear from the table, the document
said.
Already one SACP province had indicated its intention to argue for an
independent SACP electoral list in the next round of local elections.
The modality of the SACPs engagement with elections was not a matter of
timeless principle, but something that needed to be periodically analysed and
evaluated in the light of potentially shifting realities.
However, if indeed we are serious and sincere about an ANC-led election
campaign in 2009, then it is critical that we should not be ambiguous, or send
mixed signals about this over the coming eight or so months.
On the other hand, this certainly does not mean that the SACP should simply
give the ANC a blank cheque 100% party support and activist effort, but
without any serious party influence or impact on the campaign and beyond, the
document says.
Sapa
http://www.sowetan.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=840446
The political Left in South Africa is at a crossroads in the history of its
revolution, according to the SA Communist Partys policy conference discussion
document released today.
As the National Liberation Movement prepares for elections in the first half
of next year, and as we face the many new possibilities but also challenges
that have emerged since the ANCs 52nd National Conference, the question of
State power and the role of the SACP in this regard have become even more
critical.
Both the opportunities and the dangers have escalated. The SACP has a major
role to play in the current context and much depends on our ability to rise to
the occasion, the document said.
Many important positive resolutions were adopted at Polokwane, and there was
generally a much improved policy-making engagement within the African National
Congress, SACP and Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu) alliance.
However, the document said there were many challenges and threats.
The ANC, in particular, continued to be beset with very serious factional
crises and these continually spilled over into its alliance partners.
The capacity of the ANC to run an effective election campaign or to provide
strategic leadership under these conditions, and if not immediately addressed,
could be impaired.
Among other things, there were also fight back initiatives in some quarters,
seeking to undermine the progressive outcomes of Polokwane.
There was rank opportunism in some quarters either by those who regarded
themselves Polokwane victors and who sought to advance not the policy
positions agreed at conference but their own personal careers.
There were also those who were suddenly crossing the floor and becoming
zealots of the new cause.
And, at the back of all of this, was the sheer power and tactical flexibility
of the capitalist class within society, according to the documents.
TWO CONTRADICTORY FUTURE SCENARIOS
The current post-Polokwane reality contained at least two contradictory
potential scenarios.
Firstly, a scenario in which the many positive features of Polokwane the
opening up of democratic space, the consolidation of fresh policy, the
rebuilding of mass campaigning and organisation, were all taken forward.
Secondly, a negative scenario in which the Left failed to hegemonise the
post-Polokwane reality, and instead (and particularly after national elections
in 2009) a new alliance of 1996 class project floor-crossers,
compradorists and fugitives from justice coalesced around a programme of
awarding influential posts, tenders and contracts to themselves, while the
factional destabilisation (and not democratic transformation) of the state,
including the criminal justice system, persisted.
If the latter scenario prevailed, the Left would be used for the electoral
campaign and then dumped, with some individuals co-opted, while the rest were
marginalised, perhaps more brutally than before.
We are, therefore, at the crossroads in the history of our revolution. The
conjuncture is full of real space for consolidating an effective, progressive,
programmatic approach to state power.
However, the space opened up by Polokwane can also be squandered and the
opportunity lost, the document said.
PARTY INDEPENDENCE?
The struggle to ensure the hegemony of the Left in the present reality made it
imperative that the SACP return to the subject of the party and state power.
The two general possible electoral modalities for the party in 2009, were
firstly, independent [SACP] electoral lists on the voters roll with the
possible objective of constituting a coalition alliance agreement
post-elections.
Alternatively, an electoral pact with the alliance partners, which could
include agreement on deployments, possible quotas, the accountability of
elected representatives, including the accountability of SACP cadres to the
party, the election manifesto, and the importance of an independent face and
role for the SACP and its cadres within legislatures.
In practice (at least for the prospective national/provincial elections of
2009), the SACP had already chosen this latter option.
Already the SACP was actively participating in the ANC-led election campaign
planning, election manifesto preparations, and related policy-development
processes.
This did not mean that the alternative option of an independent SACP electoral
list should quietly and now forever disappear from the table, the document
said.
Already one SACP province had indicated its intention to argue for an
independent SACP electoral list in the next round of local elections.
The modality of the SACPs engagement with elections was not a matter of
timeless principle, but something that needed to be periodically analysed and
evaluated in the light of potentially shifting realities.
However, if indeed we are serious and sincere about an ANC-led election
campaign in 2009, then it is critical that we should not be ambiguous, or send
mixed signals about this over the coming eight or so months.
On the other hand, this certainly does not mean that the SACP should simply
give the ANC a blank cheque 100% party support and activist effort, but
without any serious party influence or impact on the campaign and beyond, the
document says.
Sapa
http://www.sowetan.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=840446